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International Trade and Uneven Development* 
by 
Stephen H. Hymer and Stephen A. Resnick 
Introduction 
In his article "Group Behavior and International Trade," Kindleberger 
traced the effect of the fall in the world price of wheat after 1870 on the 
trade and production of several European countries. 1 He found that England, 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark followed the classical economic model 
by allowing imports of wheat to substitute for domestic production. Germany, 
France and Italy, however, raised tariffs to counter the effect of the change 
in the terms of trade. Because of this difference in response, Kindleberger 
concluded that it was necessary to analyze group behavior, i.e., class 
struggle and alliance, in predicting how an economy reacts to changes in 
price or other economic variables. "For accurate prediction and policy-for­
mation, an adequate theory of the behavior of large groups and their com­
ponents is needed as an adjunct to the analytical tools of the market. 112 In 
technical terms, the usual economic model of international trade is misspeci­
fied since it deals only with market relations and omits important social and 
political equations. It therefore yields biased estimates and wrong predic­
tions. The model, for example, takes into account the effect of tariffs on 
the distribution of income, but not the feedback of a change in income dis­
tribution (real or threatened) on the setting of tariffs. 
More recently, Harry Johnson has also stressed the importance of the 
missing political equations in international trade theory. 3 In his 
*To appear in Kindleberger Festschrift. 
- 2 -
theoretical model of economic nationalism, he argued that many countries 
have a preference for industry over agriculture, government ownership over 
private ownership, national ownership over foreign, and import substitution 
over export expansion. These preferences determine a pattern of behavior 
quite different from that predicted by international trade theory. Instead 
of choosing the point on the production possibilities curve that maximizes 
the value of output at world prices (i.e., a point where the marginal rate 
of transformation equals the international price ratio), they use tariffs, 
subsidies, and other instruments to bias production away from Pareto Optim­
ality and to satisfy their given "non economic" preferences, e.g., they 
sacrifice real income in order to increase the share of manufacturing in 
national production or the share of nationals in the ownership of the capital 
stock. 
In a similar vein, our recent analysis of government expenditure policy 
in underdeveloped countries stressed the importance of explicitly introducing 
g:r,rernmcnt utility functions and tax equation into economic analysis. 4 We 
argued that the go,,ernment is the main provider of a large portion of the 
capitnl stock of a country (both physical and human) as well as the sole 
provider of certain essential support services. Since the government does 
n3t usually use market criteria for its production and pricing decisions, 
the observed level of production and consumption in an economy will depend 
not only on private tastes, technologies, and factor endowments, as theory 
su-::::::;ests, but also on the preferences and decision rules used by the govern­
ment, i.e., on political as well as economic equations. 
Given theGe considerations, our goal in this paper is to analyze the 
his·::oric origins of underdevelopment using a framework which includes 
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political as ·well as economic factors. Our purpose is to explain why the 
growth of the international economy over the course of the last few centuries 
has failed to equalize factor prices but instead has created a dualism be­
tween the developed and underdeveloped areas of the world. 
Among other things, we want to show the frail base upon which rest so 
many of the orthodox economists' policy recommendations for development. 
Since international trade theory tells only a portion of the story of the 
gains and losses from trade, it is seriously misleading when used by it­
self in empirical analysis and policy prescription. As the following simple 
econometric model of supply response demonstrates, the cost of ignoring 
political factors is an inability to identify economic relations and, 
therefore, an inability to make policy recommendations. 
Equation (1) describes the usual economic supply function. Equation 
(2) is a political equation relating government policy to world price. 
where: xt is exports in real terms, Pt is the world price, tt is the net 
tax rate, i.e., taxes less subsidies including expenditures on infrastruc­
ture, and uit is the error terms of the i th equation. 
Solving these equations yields the reduced form (3): 
3, Xt = a1 + bl (1 - a2) Pt - b1b2P,E ·- blPtu2t + ult 
2
=al+ BlPt + B2Pt + Ut 
The first problem encountered in any attempt to evaluate the parameters 
of supply response in this model, is the difficulty of obtaining data on t. 
One can sometimes measure tariffs and taxes accurately but it is almost 
never possible to estimate other government instruments, e.g., the value of 
- 4 -
subsidies contained in the wide variety of services offered by the govern­
ment to the private sector at reduced prices. Where.!:_ cannot be measured, 
one cannot estimate the structural equations of the model, but must confine 
the analysis to the reduced form. This is not adequate for policy. To 
formulate policy [i.e., to decide how best to alter the decision rule im­
plied by equation (2)], a government must know the value of b1 and cannot 
rely merely on the reduced form estimates, B1 and B2 , so long as b2 is not 
small. 
Thus the question of whether "power" relationships should be included 
in economic models is an empirical one and not a matter of convenience or 
of specialization between economists and political scientists. Since 
economists usually ignore political factors, structural estimates are not 
available and policy is often hampered severely. Empirical work on input/ 
output tables provides an important example of information based only on 
reduced form estimates. The coefficients of these tables, so frequently 
used by planners, are derived from the actual flows in a given year and 
do not reflect technological linkages alone, as they purport to, but 
also the tastes, interests and limitations of the previous governments' 
decision rules. Thus there are good econometric reasons for a government 
interested in overcoming underdevelopment, i.e., changing policy and 
structure, to be wary of them. 
This model also points to another important problem for policy-making 
even where accurate estimates oft are available. Suppose that a previous 
government had been characterized by a decision rule which attempted to 
stabilize price to producers by varying.!:_ inversely to P (e.g., through 
a Marketing Board). This would reduce the observed variance of P(l - t) 
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and increase the difficulty of estimating the coefficients of equation (1) 
thus making it difficult to use past experience as a basis for future 
policy. More generally, when a government attempts to change the structure 
of an economy (i.e., develop), it often finds the data generated by the 
previous structure (i.e., the historical facts) to be unhelpful as a basis 
for policy. Revolution, by definition, implies values of a's and b's 
outside the historical sample, and only under very special conditions would 
the statistical estimates of those coefficients apply to non-marginal 
changes. Ideology supplies the strength to ignore the facts. One of the 
important purposes of historical analysis is to show how power relations in 
the past constrained the full development of the productive potential of 
the economy. 
The essay is divided into three parts corresponding to the three major 
stages of the international economy: Mercantilism (late 15th to 19th century), 
Colonialism (1870·-1939) and The Present. For convenience we call these 
Mercantilism I, Mercantilism II and Mercantilism III, since they represent 
successive stages of unequal trade and uneven development. The argument is 
conducted heuristically, but our hope is to proceed at a later point to 
theoretical and econometric models using sets of interdependent political 
and economic equations. 
Mercantilism I: 15th Century to 1870 
The Mercantilist period created the first truly international economy. 
The oceans were transformed from a barrier separating Europe from Asia, 
1-\merica and Africa, to a medium of exchange and new dimensions for commer­
cial intercourse were opened up. Ironically, the global integration which 
created~ world, unified by mercantile and political relationships, also 
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led to the fragmentation of its parts into a small set of developing coun­
tries and a large group of stunted and deformed economies which became the 
underdeveloped areas of the world. It is this historical process of uneven 
development which we will focus upon in the following analysis. 
International trade theory5 predicts that in a market system the fall 
in transport costs created by the age of exploration would lead to an in­
crease in trade and improved welfare for the world as a whole as well as 
for each of its trading countries. Individuals and groups within a coun­
try may, of course, gain or lose depending on their ownership of factors 
of production. In an egalitarian peasant economy for example, all indivi­
duals will be better off since they share equally in the resources of the 
country. In a more highly developed civilization such as existed in parts 
of Asia and South America, labor should lose and land gain since imported 
manufactures would substitute for crafts and services while increased ex­
ports of primary products would raise the value of natural resources. 
Our model yields different results because it takes into account 
political as well as market relationships. Mercantilist trade changed 
the power structure within and between countries and this radical break 
is of greater importance in explaining the patterns of trade and income 
distribution than is the market reaction to price focused upon in the 
orthodox model. 
Figure 1 is a device to illustrate the employment structure of the 
traditional economy and the changes that occurred as a result of 
Mercantilsm I trade. The diagram is based on an equation linking food 
production (and consumption) per capita!_ to: output per man-hour in 
agriculture a, hours per man in agriculture E_, and the percentage of 
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persons engaged in agriculture n. 
4. f = ahn 
For a given per capita food standard, Equation (4) traces out a rectangular 
hyperbola, AA, describing possible distributions of the work force of a 
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FIGURE 1 
point such as A (which we shall argue represents one of the prevalent
1 
African modes of production) nearly the entire population is engaged in 
the agrarian sector (n approaches 1), but the hours worked per man in agri­
culture are low. At a point such as (Oriental Despotism), a much largerA2 
fraction of the population is outside the agrarian sector, while those 
engaged in agriculture are more fully specialized and work substantially 
longer hours in farming in order to produce an agricultural surplus for 
the remainder of the population. 
- 8 -· 
The distribution of time in non-agricultural activities can be illus­
trated in Figure 1 by dropping perpendiculars to each axis. The vertical 
distance between the total hours of labor per worker hand the actual 
hours worked in agriculture per worker E. represents the time available 
in t.½e agrarian sector for the production of household goods and services 
which we have labeled Z goods in a previous paper, 
7 z1 = (h - h)n. 
The horizontal distance between the total population C!: = 1) and 
that fraction engaged in agriculture~ represents the proportion engaged 
in what the Physiocrats called the unproductive sector, i.e., the a:i:.isto­
crats, soldiers, servants, officers, clerks, traders and artisans associ­
ated with the state sector, z2 = h(l -· n). 
The African case w·as_ characterized by a small state sector because 
its egalitarian political structure inhibited the appropriation of the 
surplus by a small group. Most families had full rights to land and paid 
little, if anything, in the way of rents or taxes either in kind or in 
labor services. The fraction z2 was, thus, very small (in many cases
 even 
the chief's family grew its own food) while the portion of time spent on 
Z1 was la~ge, much of it was devoted to leisure and ceremony.
8 
An opposite pattern is found in the Asian case. Because of the great 
power of the state to extract a surplus, z2 is large and z1 is small. A 
large number of people are engaged in extracting the surplus from agri­
cultural workers, managing the affairs of the bureaucracy, and providing 
consumption goods and services for the state. In order to meet their 
taxes, the agricultural population must reduce their consu.rnption ~f z1 and 
devote their time to producing an agricultural surplus. In addition, the 
requirements of corvee further reduce the time available for household 
production. 
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In the diagram, as we have drawn it, the standard of life for the 
majority of the population is clearly superior in the African case. Food 
consumption per capita is the same in both cases by assumption, while z1 
is much greater in Africa than in Asia. This result depends crucially on 
the assumption that AA is a rectangular hyperbola. In rea.li ty there are 
several reasons for believing that agricultural labor productivity associ-
ated with the Asian mode differs from that found in Africa. The advanced 
civilization associated with Oriental Despotism was based on a hydraulic 
society which implied investment of resources in irrigation and other infra­
structure to increase agricultural output. ,If ~ was sufficiently higher as a re­
sult of this investment, it would be possible then for h (hours per 
worker in agriculture) to be the same in both cases even t.hough the Asian 
mode had a larger z2 . This would have happened if the state in practice 
charged a tithe exactly equal to its social productivity so that the agri­
cultural population did not suffer because of its existence. There is no 
historical reason to believe this was the case. Studies of Oriental Des-
potism suggest that the state attempted to maximize the surplus and to 
reduce income in the agricultural sector to the minimum necessary for sur­
vival, and sometimes not even that. 9 Moreover, some of the government 
infrastructure was needed merely to compensate for diminishing returns 
resulting from the use of a higher labor/land ratio. 10 
The revolutionary impact of the new trading possibilities introduced 
by Mercantilism I led to the growth of the state in certain African econ­
omies and to a movement towards the Asian mode; \-rhile in certain Asian 
economies it led to a decline in state power and a movement away from 
their original position. This movement is shown by the arrows in Figure 1. 
·- 10 ~ 
In both cases, there is a dramatic change in the composition of output and 
its distribution even though national income did not necessarily increase 
and in some cases fell. 
In the African case, the new opportunities for foreign trade provided 
both an incentive and the means for the growth of a state sector. Economic 
factors were not the sole cause of state formation but were an important 
contributing factor. A military group which succeeded in monopolizing co­
ercive power in a given area could establish peace and security for traders, 
and levy taxes accordingly. The state, in a word, substituted tolls and 
tariffs for banditry. The larger the area brought under control, the 
greater the taxes that could be charged, and the more powerful a military 
and bureaucratic establishment that could be supported. The strength of 
the state could also be used to capture slaves, to organize slave production 
of exportables (in gold mining for example) or to meet food requirements. 
It was thus possible to expropriate a surplus through exploitation of labor 
as well as through taxation of trade. 
The impact of Mercantilism I on income in Africa and its distribution 
was very complex. The local elites benefited, as did both the plantation 
owners in the new world and the merchants who organized the elaborate mer­
cantile system based on the slave trade. To the e,{tent that it partici­
pated in the upsurge of economic activity on a voluntary basis a certain 
portion of the population at large also benefited by trading food or manu­
factures for imported goods. Nonetheless, gains were in no way commensurate 
with the enormous dead weight loss associated with the capture of slaves 
and their exploitation in plantations. As regards Africa, therefore, the 
production possibilities of society shifted inward due to those losses 
from trade. Amongst those who remained, there was a reallocation of labor 
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into z2 due to the growth of the state (it is assumed that z2 
includes 
plantation production) and out of z1 as free men su
bstituted imported 
goods for domestic manufactures. The distribution of employment r
esem­
bled more closely that of the Asian society but the distribution o
f in­
come among the living was quite different. The standard of life o
f 
slaves were repressed belm,, the preceding levels, but the standard
 of 
life of free men was increased because their marketed surplus was 
com·­
pensated by imported goods rather than simply taken away through t
axes. 
In the Asian case the co~ing of the Hest led to the undermining of
 
the power structure in countries or regions characterized by the A
siatic 
mode of production. The steady penetration of Western traders fro
m the 
16th century onwards eroded the political and economic relationshi
ps 
In terms of Figure 1, there was a decline inbased on Oriental Despotism. 
z2 and an increase in z1 as labor was fre
ed from activities serving the 
Thus the Asian mode moved somewhat in the direction of the Africanstate. 
as the influence of the state declined and that of the West increa
sed. 
The impact of Mercahtilism I trade thus at first led to an improve
ment in 
welfare as the decline of z2 and rise in z1 distributed income
 in favor 
The decline of Oriental Despotism with itsof the long exploited peasant. 
unproductive class of retainers and its demands for corvee labor m
eant 
that the wage-rental ratio for the society as a whole rose contrar
y to the 
predictions of the classical model. 
In some areas a new z2 a.rose in conne
ction with the expansion of com­
mercial activity as new trading routes to the West replaced the hi
storical 
trade among China, India, and Southeast Asia. The flourishing of 
this 
trade during the 17th and especially the 18th century led to the g
rowth of 
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Western controlled coastal regions and port areas and the demand for a food 
surplus to service traders, soldiers and consuls. In these areas, z (the2 
new sector specializing in commercial activity) rose while z declined, re­1 
placed by imported manufactures, as the hinterland specialized in food or 
export production. 
Through time, the West pushed steadily inward and established a new 
system of political control. The tendency to improve welfare increasingly 
came under pressure as the West increased its ability to control the indi­
genous work force, to enforce tribute, and to levy taxes. A.s the West's 
ability to extract a surplus grew , the share of the gains from trade going 
to the vast majority of the population declined and only a small class of 
foreign traders and rulers ,or, in some regions, local elites benefited 
substantially. The peasant, freed from Oriental Despotism, found himself 
increasingly bound to a new master, and there was once again a tendency 
for z (including plantation labor) to rise and z1 to fall. 2 
The Western impact in Latin America (Mexico and Peru) was different 
in that the existing political structure was quickly taken over and the 
population exploited at a maximal rate. So ruthless was the appropriation 
of the surplus in gold and silver mining that a large percentage of the 
population soon died. The complex pattern of Western rule and coloniza­
tion which existed in Asia was, therefore, not duplicated in Latin America. 
There was a total collapse of society and enormous losses from trade. 
Our models of trade in Mercantilism I have emphasized shifts in the 
power structures rather than movements along production possibilities 
curve and have yielded quite different predictions about changes in produc­
tion, employment, and distribution of income than those of international 
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trade theory. our analysis can be summarized in the following simple balance 
equation of the Gains and Losses from Trade (providing one is willing to 
accept, for the sake of argument, the measurability of changes in welfare): 
Gains to Elite Gains (or Losses) to Gains from 
in Europe + Majority in Europe = Trade 
Gains to Elite Losses of Ex­ Deadweight 
in Underdevel­ + ploited -· Loss 
oped Countries 
The crucial feature of Mercantilism I is that the overall gains from 
trade were small and the deadweight loss was large. It is hard to imagine 
any reasonable set of calculations which would show that the value of the 
increase in world income during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries could 
offset the tremendous costs associated with the murder and enslavement of 
Africans and Americans. This is true even if one were to argue that there 
net gain in welfare for those Asian countries in which the populationwas a 
was freed from Oriental Despotisrn. 11 Many of the gains accruing to the 
elites in the underdeveloped world and Europe (and possibly to workers in 
Europe) arose mainly from the shifts in power and increased exploitation 
rather than from increased productivity. This slash and burn capitalism 
was possible only because Mercantilism I was able to use the human capital 
accumulated over previous centuries and did not worry about maintaining 
its reproduction. 
If Mercantilism I caused an inward shift in the production possibil­
ities curve in parts of Africa and America, it also caused an outward 
shift in Europe. Again, changes in the distribution of income and power 
were the crucial factors. It is not necessary to postulate that Europe 
as a whole (or even England as a whole) gained from Mercantilism I to ex-
plain the phenomenal rise in savings, investment, and income in the 19th cen­
tury. The important feature is that some groups benefited and that a new 
class was formed out of the gains from trade. In other words, in place of 
the usual neoclassical formulation for investment (I= sY) we would substi­
tute the equation (I'= s'Yc) where I' refers only to investment in industry 
Ye refers to the income of the capitalist class ands' refers to the capital­
ist savings rate. An increase in industrial capital could then occur even 
if Y fell as long as Yc/Y rose sufficiently. Empirically, it is difficult to 
estimate what happened to Y, but it is clear that Mercantilism I led to the 
growth of capitalist income and power in Europe. 
The steps in this process are interesting. At first, the merchant 
capitalist class had little power and was subjected to discrimination by the 
feudalistic state. However, the new possibilities of maritime commerce and 
exploitation led to an alliance between the state and merchants (in some 
cases pirates). It was highly profitable for the monarch to subsidize 
international trade and offer it protection because of the profits to be 
gained. Thus the state and the emerging capitalist class grew in step 
though much of the increased national power was dissipated in international 
rivalry. Eventually the capitalist class became sufficiently strong to 
take power and to switch government expenditure away from the agrarian sec­
tor, remove agrarian preferences and protection and to increase agrarian 
taxes. This further enhanced the industrial capitalist class and led to 
its further growth. During the 19th century, industrial capital emerged 
triumphant, dismantled the corn law structure and the rest of the Mercantilist 
framework and created a new technology based on iron and steam and a new 
set of government policies (so called laissez-faire) with which it conquered 
·- 15 -
the world and laid the basis for the second international economy. A total 
restructuring and reorganization of the hinterland occurred in Mercantilism 
II as Europe formulated a single strategic conception for the development of 
the world economy and planned a new division of labor. Many of the main-
stays of Mercantilisrn I were cast away, like the first stage of a rocket, 
and new enclaves of growth were created. Mercantilism II began as an un-
equal partnerhsip based on the asymmetrical results of Mercantilism I, and 
during the course of its lifetime, it further widened the gap between Europeans 
and non-Europeans. 
Mercantilism II: 1870 to World War II 
The period from 1870 to the 1920's was characterized by a fall in inter­
national transportation costs and an increase in the variety of manufactured 
goods available for trading. Trade theory predicts these events would cause 
the hinterlands of Africa, Asia, and America to expand export production and 
to replace the production of home goods by imported manufactures. The outward 
shift in the production possibilities curve would imply an increase in national 
income but not necessarily a corresponding improvement in welfare of every 
subgroup. The initial impact of this trade could, for example, lower wage 
rates and the standards of living of large parts of the population as produc­
tio~ of labor intensive home-goods declined and the production of land-inten­
sive export goods increased. Through time, however, the level of income would 
be expected to rise for everyone. Increase income would lead to increased 
savings and investment, and an outward shift in the production possibilities 
curve. A rise in wages would occur as the capital/labor ratio increased. 
Broadly speaking, this scenario fits a large number of countries. It 
explains the great expansion of trade, the emergence of surplus labor, the 
- 16 -
strengthening of the landowning class, and the growth of mercantile capital­
ists. Furthermore, it also predicts the eventual investment in industry 
after the 1930's, the growth of the industrial labor force, and the e:rner­
gence, in the late 1960's, of manufacturing exports. Even the attraction 
of foreign investment finds support in the predictive power of the theory 
because of the increased infrastructure and human capital financed by the 
export economy. 
'rhis scenario, however, should not be used in trade classes to illus·­
trate the benefits of greater integration into the world economy because 
it omits "power" equations and incorrectly identifies the structure of the 
system. The fact that so many underdeveloped countries with such diverse 
backgrounds followed the pattern outlined above indicates common biases in 
government policy rather than the power of the trade model. Neoclassical 
theory would predict a much greater variety of growth patterns given the 
great diversity of initial conditions and is to some extent falsified by 
this common experience. We suggest that the expansion of exports reflected 
in large part the similar policies of colonial rule, while the growth of 
manufacturing reflected the growing strength of the indigenous capitalist 
class associated with the "national independence" movements after World War 
II. 
Colonial strategy squeezed the traditional economy to create an elastic 
supply of labor and biased infrastructure towards exports in order to trans­
fer the surplus to the center in the form of lower prices. The specific 
labor policies used conformed to no single pattern, rather a variety of de­
vices emerged to deal with the variety of initial conditions. In some cases 
the government levied labor taxes or poll taxes to stimulate an exodus from 
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the "traditional" economy into the "commercial" economy. In other cases, 
the government seized the land or created a landlord class thus reducing 
the opportunity cost of wage labor. The fostering of a proletariat for 
the export sector (including the food surplus to feed it) was also stimu­
lated through land concentration, intensification of tenure arrangements, 
and the growth of indebtedness. National and international mobility was 
encouraged as the government helped in recruitment and enforcement of con­
tracts thus making possible vast transferences of population within con­
tinents as well as from Asia to Africa and America. In this way, labor and 
exports were generated in each colony. 
The gains from trade generated during Mercantilism II were shared un­
evenly. Initially, there was a decline (sometimes drastic) in the stan­
dard of living for many people as they were coerced into export production. 
Through time, this decline tended to be reversed as new opportunities were 
made available in the commercial economy. Increased specialization led to 
new divisions of labor and created new dependencies as resources were real­
located from the traditional economy to export production and the personal­
ized society of the village was fragmented. The striking feature of Merc­
;mtilism II, however, is that the standard of living for the vast majority 
of the population of Africa, Asia, and America rose very slowly in sharp 
contrast to the progress at the center. 
Although exact statistics are not available, evidence suggests that the 
real wage for unskilled labor has risen slowly over the last 50 to 100 
years, and this wage can be taken as a proxy for the level of income of per­
haps two-thirds of the population. Moreover, other evidence suggests that 
debt peonage and tenure arrangements increased in the agrarian sector as 
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peasants found themselves increasingly bound to money lenders and absentee 
landowners. No doubt there was some improvement in consumption patterns as 
superior European manufactures increasingly replaced native rural industry. 
HOwever, the displacement of rural industry and traditional activities also 
led to the fragmentation of the agrarian society, and in many countries, 
especially those in which export specialization proceeded most rapidly, there 
was a serious dete1:ioration of the social life of the society.
12 
The gains fro~ trade were partly captured by local elites (some of whom 
were foreigners fro~11 the mother country) who accumulated land, capital, edu­
cation, or the rights to higher-paying employment in the government bureau­
cracy or in the commercial economy. Often an alien complex of production 
was established where the peasant cultivated the soil or worked in the mines, 
a foreign me::-ca.ntile class grew in strength (in Asia, Chinese, and in Africa, 
Indian), and r.he Europeans controlled the import-export trade as well as 
determined colonial expenditure and labor policies. The distribution of in­
come refle=tcd the political power of this economic structure. Much of the 
gains from export g:7owth went to the government (in the form of increased 
revenues), to the urba_n centers (where services and industry grew based on 
export growth), and to local and foreign elites of one type of another. 
In part, the gains were passed abroad in the form of lower prices. The 
division between the metropole and the local elite depended largely on the 
propensities to :i.mport. If surplus receivers had a much higher propensity 
to import thc:n the population as a whole, the "cheap labor" policies followed 
would be export bi?.sed to the benefit of the mother country. On the other 
hand, if local elites spent a high proportion of their income on local 
services,they w:::u1d divert labor from export production. This would still 
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involve an international transfer of surplus since a high proportion of this 
elite income went to foreign settlers and colonial officials from the mother 
country. The surplus would, hO'tATever, tend to be consumed locally rather 
than in the center. 
This possible anti-trade bias was offset, at least in the initial phase 
of colonialism, by a number of other policies designed to specifically en­
courage exports. Many labor policies directed labor towards particular in­
dustries, e.g. mining, whose only function was production for exports. 
Similarly, infrastructure was heavily biased towards export production and 
neglected the production of home goods pr plaeed it at a disadvantage. In 
other words, the steps taken to produce cheap labor were combined with steps 
taken to induce it to flow into exports. 
The observed high elasticity of exports in this period thus reflects 
government policy as well as market response. A high export price resulting 
from an expansion of demand would induce an increase in private investment 
because of high profits. It would also provide the government with extra 
revenue (since trade taxes were the dominant source of funds) and thus lead 
to the improvement of infrastructure and other support services which would 
further stimulate international supply because of their export bias. Thus 
a strong tendency towards immizerizing growth was built into the system, for 
any rise in price would trigger an expantion of export biased investment 
until price fell sufficiently. 
An alternative development strategy would have allocated a greater share 
of public investment to home good industries and produced a more balanced 
investment program. This would have a substitution and an income effect. 
The substitution effect of removing the export bias in infrastructure might 
bias production away from exports but this might be offset by the income 
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effect from growth if importables were highly income elastic. Moreover, the 
development of the hinterland would have increased the variety of possible 
exports and provided new opportunities for mutually beneficial trade. 
A more forward looking policy would have directed a large flow of funds 
from the center to the periphery for investment purposes. The dominant fea­
ture of Mercantilism II was the global capital market centered in London. 
For the first time in history investment decisions throughout the world were 
coordinated in one plaee and subjected to a single strategic conception. It 
thus became technically possible to spread capital evenly throughout the 
world. In other words, capital accumulation after 1870 could have proceeded 
via capital widening rather than capital deepening, i.e., the capital labor 
ratio could have remained constant and a far larger number of people ~ctiv­
ated as industrial workers. This would have soon exhausted the metropolitan 
labor force and either capital would have had to move to the hinterland or 
labor move to the center. This, combined with efficient trade, would have 
produced factor price equalization on a global basis. In other words, had 
this strategy been followed, industrial capitalism would have reproduced for 
the entire world population the higher level of living it achieved for 
Europeans. (The term Europeans is used to include people of European descent 
in all continents.) 
The whole pattern of production and trade would have been quite differ­
ent in such a system. Manufacturing production would have spread through­
out the world, earnings and output per worker employed would have been much 
lower, but both the work and•its fruits would have been shared equally. The 
structure of manufacturing output would be altered towards the mass produc­
tion of basic consumption needs rather than towards the high income goods 
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that account for most of industrial output. Instead of this, capital accumu­
lation proceeded via capital deepening in the industrial countries and led to 
a widening differential in production and income between the center and the 
hinterland. Thus, the returns to labor were not equalized despite the great 
expansion of trade after 1870 and large migrations of Europeans, Asians, and 
Africans. 
Capital per worker was raised and the expansion of the industrial labor 
force slowed down. This created a radically different structure of demand 
from the egalitarian one just described, and led to an economy based on con­
tinuous "creative destruction" to use Schumpeter's phrase. Because the cap­
ital labor ratio increased steadily, the producer good sector had to contin­
uously innovate labor saving machinery. Raising per capita income for a small 
favored group meant a continuous change in the basket of goods consumed since, 
according to Engel's law, people tend not to consume more of the same as they 
get richer, but reallocate their consumption patterns away from old goods 
towards new goods. Thus, towards the end of the 19th century, product innova­
tion and marketing became the dominant problems of business enterprise rather 
than the mass production of goods. Instead of applying the achievements of 
science widely and solving the basic problems of subsistence for the majority 
of the world's population, attention was focused on creating "new products" 
and lightening the work load of the privileged under the guise of technological 
change. 
Why was the second path chosen rather than the first? It could have been 
due to the exogenous factor of technological change or differences in production 
functions, as many economic models imply, but we would argue that political 
factors were an important if not dominant determinant. In our view, the ob-
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served uneven development represented uneven power and the resulting distribu­
tion of income and demand was a social phenomenon rather than a technical one. 
The control device was government expenditure. Private capital was high­
ly mobile during this period and flowed to wherever profit could be made. But 
the rate of profit or the demand for investment in any country depended upon 
the extent of public investment in infrastructure and human capital. The 
colonial system centralized power over government expenditure policy and in­
sured a much higher rate of public capital formation in the center than in the 
hinterland. This biased distribution of public capital provided "external 
economies" in the center and directed private industrial capital away from the 
hinterland 
That this policy neither maximized world income nor distributed it equally 
is not surprising. The imperial system did not weigh people equally in its 
social welfare function. Political power was used to foster the growth of the 
capital of the mother country-(i.e., the capitalists), subject to the constraints 
of class conflict. Using Kindleberger's group behavior approach, we might 
analyze the policy of this period in terms of the alliances and coalitions 
formed between the following groups: 
Center Hinterland 
Capital Cl c2 
Land Tl T2 
Labor Ll L2 
Let us first examine trade between Europe and the areas of European set­
tlement in America, Oceania and Africa. According to the theory of the time, 
wascolonization, i.e., the migration of Europeans to other continents, a 
method of expanding land and warding off the tendency for profits to fall be­
cause of diminishing returns in agriculture. The resulting pattern of inter-
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national trade initially involved the exchange of manufactures for raw mater­
ials because of two important historical advantages associated with the mother 
country: (1) a large domestic market giving rise to internal and external 
economies, (2) a strong caoitalist class (or stock of entrepreneurship). Through 
time, the colony developed its own manufacturing sector (aided perhaps by 
tariffs or other government instruments) as the internal market expanded and 
as the indigenous capitalist class acquired the strength and resources to en­
gage in industrial activity. Two-way trade in manufactures could then begin 
based on differences in comparative advantage and tastes. 
As Kindleberger noted, the smooth working of this model would only take 
place under specific political conditions. Since trade would tend to reduce 
rents, it could only occur where the resistance of landlords was weak. In 
England, where the industrial classes had reached a position of dominance, 
this condition prevailed and free trade allowed the importation of wheat which 
helped to complete the lig~idation of landlords as the most powerful economic 
group in Britain. 13 But in Germany, the agricultural class was sufficiently 
strong to stop this development from taking place. Ironically, growth and de­
velopment proceeded much more rapidly after 1870 in Germany than in the rest 
of Europe, perhaps because of the balance struct between agricultural and in­
dustrial classes. The fusion of rye and steel created a powerful alliance 
which could use the state's power to pursue a growth-oriented strategy. 
In terms of the above framework, the major conflict was between T1 and T2 • 
The politics of labor were relatively unimportant because it was not yet well 
organized and, in any case, labor tended to benefit from the cheap wheat. It 
also could migrate to the hinterland when severely hurt at the center (see 
Kindleberger' s discussion of Italy) . •rhe conflict between c1 and c2 was also 
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muted in the early stage because of the low degree of capitalist development in 
America. 
After 1870, this power structure changed drastically. The landed classes 
became unimportant as a separate interest group (in the center) because they 
were destroyed or absorbed into industrial capital. The English capitalist 
class lost its hegemonic position as native bourgeoisies arose on the contin­
ent, in A.merica, and in Japan. Rivalry between C's became a dominant element 
in the foundation of Mercantilism II. 
Equally important, labor became a powerful force as it became concentrated 
in industrial centers. The class-consciousness was accentuated in England be­
cause of the shock of the great transformation out of agriculture and into 
the city as a consequence of wheat imports. 
The result of these changes was that the Imperial centers were in no posi­
tion to embark on a "big push" in the hinterland. Their main concerns were to 
ward off rivalry from competing centers, and to satisfy the growing demands of 
labor. Their policies tended to be defensive rather than offensive, mercantil­
ist (i.e. protectionist) rather than free trade, and ironically Edwardian Eng­
land revived the paraphernalia of the landed aristocracy it had just destroyed. 
Many of the policies of Mercantilism II thus slowed down the rate of growth 
and prevented the full development of the potential created by the scientific 
revolution. The fact is masked by growth statistics which show what happened 
instead of what could have happened. Unlike Mercantilism I, where the dead­
weight losses exceeded the gains, technological achievements of the 19th century 




Instead of promoting the growth of enterprise in the hinterland, colonial 
policy arrested the development of native capitalists by failing to provide 
positive incentives and by the application of negative measures including, in 
some cases, outright destruction of burgeoning enterpreneurship. For similar 
reasons, they preferred low wage/low productivity labor in the hinterland over 
high wage/high productivity workers because the latter would have been a poten­
tial political threat. The dual of this policy was to create a labor aris-toc­
racy in the center and to protect it through tariffs and immigration policy. 
Education programs and expenditures were unequal being biased towards labor in 
the center. The two parts of the labor force must be seen as one if this per­
iod is to be analyzed properly. 
Finally, the center had to devote an increased share of government activity 
to military and other non·-productive expenditures and had to rely frequently in 
the hinterland on an alliance with an inefficient class of landlords, officials, 
and soldiers, to maintain stability at the cost of development. A great part 
of the surplus extracted from the population was thus wasted locally. 
The ideology of Mercantilism II, as reflected in economic theory, was 
capitalism triumphant. By the early twentieth century, nearly all of the com­
ponents needed to solve mankind's material problems had been discovered. The 
only task left was the systems analysis problem of organizing and applying 
them. Mercantilism II began with great promise but after a brief time-span 
became seriously troubled and increasingly characterized by War, Depression, 
the Breakdown of the International Economy, and War again, rather than by Free 
Trade, Pax Brittanica, and Material Improvement. 
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Mercantilism III 
Political change, i.e., national independence, is clearly at the heart of 
the policy changes that ushered in Mercantilism III. The depression and World 
War II weakened the center allowing the national bourgeois class (C2), born in 
the colonial export economy, to assert independence and to divert government 
expenditures to their own ends. Their control was, however, far from complete 
and the restrictions and biases of the international economic system governed 
much of their actions. They did not, for example, face perfectly competitive 
markets in which they could trade freely with other countries. Instead, they 
frequently encountered large oligopolistic corporations with whom they had to 
bargain for needed investment goods and technology. Moreover, the governments 
in the advanced countries, though no longer possessing legal control, contin­
ued to exert pressure to keep the hinterland open to capital and manufactured 
goods from the center. Finally, the tariff structure used by the center effect­
ively closed the rich industrial markets to manufacturing exports from the hin­
terland. 
The set of policy options open to the newly independent countries were 
thus severely restricted (especially with respect to their control over the ex­
port staples and the accompanying network of financial intermediaries) while 
their targets and search procedures reflected and were limited by their dis­
advantaged past. The national bourgeois were, in effect, middlemen who did 
not understand the wider system above them and who could not mobilize the peo­
ple below them. Given the limited vantage point of their past, they became 
imitators rather than innovators; they were children of the Europeans, an under­
developed middle class. Forced industrialization became their strategy and the 
goal was to create a national capitalist class by using protection and import-
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substitution policies. The result was uneven development. 
Although there seems to be a variety of experiences in the post-war period, 
as each country endeavored to formulate a national policy peculiar to its cir­
cumstances, a common theme is found in the tendency to reproduce on a national 
scale the pattern of the international economy evolved during Mercantilism I 
and II. Capital formation is concentrated in urban centers resulting in rising 
capital labor ratios, productivity, and per capita income for a small group of 
people. The neglect of the agrarian sector leads to rural stagnation and an 
An income and class gap emergesunlimited supply of labor at low wages. 
parallel to the international gap between European and non-European previously 
c:Jescribed. 
Basically, the import substitution policies result in a rapid growth of 
Themanufacturing centered in urban areas with little generation of employment. 
economic reasons usually given are the labor-saving nature of foreign technology 
coupled with :i.mperfe.::tior:s in the factor market which cause the imported price 
of capital to be too low and lead to a steady increase in the organized manu­
facturing sector's capital labor ratio. 
Although we cannot analyze this system in detail here, we do want to point 
out, in the spirit of thi.s paper, that the reasons behind this scenario lie as 
much in the "power" equations as the market equations. The biases in economic 
structure come from the governments' attempt to favor one sector over another. 
The devices used to protect the national capitalist class have long been studied 
by trade eco:!:Jmi:::ts, i.e., the instruments of tariffs, quotas, exchange controls, 
import-licensing, and internal subsidies. Less fully analyzed, but equally im­
portant, are the bi.ases in government infrastructure towards urban industrial 
needs, the establ~.shmf':nt of a discriminatory educational system, and the use of 
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the police-power of the state to suppress the rural population and maintain 
the surplus of labor at the existing wage. It is these policies and the in­
volved political relationships, and not merely the shape of production func­
tions, that help to explain the output mix, factor proportions, and factor 
prices observed. The symbiosis between the national bourgeois and the state 
favored capital and a select group of urban labor at the expense of the pop­
ulation as a whole, and this resulted in a rapid growth of manufacturing, an 
increase in industrial wages rather than employment, and an excess demand for 
jobs. It also resulted in an output mix aimed at the few, emphasizing import 
substitution rather than import displacement. 14 In other words, the "inde­
pendence" strategy accepted foreign tastes and foreign technology and tried 
to reproduce them on a miniature basis instead of adapting to local needs and 
local endowments. 
There is reason to believe that this strategy is reaching a turning. 
point as it encounters increased imbalance in the labor market and the for­
eign exchange market. A new solution is threrfore needed to deal with the 
crisis in population, employment and balance of payments which result from 
growing political pressure from the excluded population and the international 
economy. The basis for it seems to be an alliance between c2 and c1 , the 
native capitalist class and the Multinational Corporation. This new group­
behavior, if it continues to develop, will lead to new economic configurations 
and a new international division of labor. We cannot analyze it in detail 
here but we might conclude the essay with a few conjectures about the next 
round of Mercantilism III. 
We argued that Mercantilism I led to the formation of c1 , while Mercantil­
ism II broke down, in large part, because of rivalries between subgroups of Cl' 
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i.e:, the various national capitals of the center.· In the first round of 
Mercantilism III, c2 succeeded in establishing itself as a minor partner 
secure but in no way powerful enough to challenge or replace c1 • Meanwhile, 
a new relationship has appeared within c1 in the form of a growing trend 
towards rnultinationalization of private enterprise. Mergers and foreign in­
vestment by American and European firms are leading to interpenetration of 
markets and the weakening of links between particular countries and particu­
lar firms. 15 
Thus the stage is set for a new international industrial structure dom­
inated by 300 to 500 large North Atlantic oligopolistic corporations which 
operate on a global basis in cooperation with smaller national firms who 
serve as suppliers, distributorsv licensees, and in some ways, as competitors. 
The trade pattern associated with this international hierarchy of decision­
making will lead to an exchange of goods and services based on skill differ.-· 
entials. The center will specialize in complex manufacture and high-level 
technology, i.e., systems designv research, marketing, finance, while the 
hinterland will specialize in labor-intensive production. The multinational 
corporation, if it succeeds, will reproduce on a world-level the centraliza­
tion of control found in its internal administrative structure. 
Three major political questions dominate any attempt to predict the 
future course of the international economy. First, will there be some sort 
of alliance of L's to match the alliance of C's? Second, will multinational 
corporations be able to construct multinational political institutions to 
replace the nation-states whose power they are eroding? Third, will it be 
possible to resolve rivalry between the capitalist and socialist block and 
within the capitalist block itself (e.g., the problem of Japan and Germany)? 
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The progression from Mercantilism I to Mercantilism II to Mercantilism III 
has seen an increased complexity of political and economic linkages between 
countries. Modern communications and the multinational corporations are in­
creasing inter-connectedness to so great an extent that a qualitatively new 
system is emerging. The greater the interactions between countries, the 
greater the interdependence, i.e., the higher are international multipliers, 
the lower are national multipliers. If we.were dealing purely with market 
relationships, this would not be a troublesome factor, since a great deal is 
known by economists about the self-regulating properties of general equilibrium 
systems involving many decision units. These stability propertic~ do not hold 
on the political plane where tariff struggles and "beggar rr,y neighbor" policies, 
etc., lead away from pareto optimality. International trade theory, because it 
does not include these political factors, is misleading and costly in analyz­
ing the current world economy. 
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